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A common theme among the proposed models for network epidemics is the assumption that the
propagating object, i.e., a virus or a piece of information, is transferred across the nodes without
going through any modification or evolution. However, in real-life spreading processes, pathogens
often evolve in response to changing environments and medical interventions and information is
often modified by individuals before being forwarded. In this paper, we investigate the evolution
of spreading processes on complex networks with the aim of i) revealing the role of evolution on
the threshold, probability, and final size of epidemics; and ii) exploring the interplay between the
structural properties of the network and the dynamics of evolution. In particular, we develop a
mathematical theory that accurately predicts the epidemic threshold and the expected epidemic
size as functions of the characteristics of the spreading process, the evolutionary dynamics of the
pathogen, and the structure of the underlying contact network. In addition to the mathematical
theory, we perform extensive simulations on random and real-world contact networks to verify our
theory and reveal the significant shortcomings of the classical mathematical models that do not
capture evolution. Our results reveal that the classical, single-type bond-percolation models may
accurately predict the threshold and final size of epidemics, but their predictions on the probability of
emergence are inaccurate on both random and real-world networks. This inaccuracy sheds the light
on a fundamental disconnect between the classical bond-percolation models and real-life spreading
processes that entail evolution. Finally, we consider the case when co-infection is possible, i.e., a
susceptible individual who receives simultaneous infections with multiple pathogen strains becomes
co-infected. We show that co-infection gives rise to a rich set of dynamics: it can amplify or inhibit
the spreading dynamics, and more remarkably lead the order of phase transition to change from
second-order to first-order. We investigate the delicate interplay between the network structure,
mutation schemes, and co-infection dynamics and reveal the cases where such interplay induces
first-order phase transitions for the expected epidemic size.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What causes an outbreak of a disease? How can we
predict its emergence and control its progression? Over
the past several decades, multidisciplinary research ef-
forts were converging to tackle the above questions, aim-
ing for providing a better understanding of the intricate
dynamics of disease propagation and accurate predictions
on its course [1–12]. At the heart of these research efforts
is the development of mathematical models that provide
insights on predicting, assessing, and controlling poten-
tial outbreaks [13–16]. The early mathematical models
relied on the homogeneous mixing assumption, meaning
that an infected individual is equally likely to infect any
other individual in the population, without regard to her
location, age, or the people with whom she interacts. Ho-
mogeneity allowed writing a set of differential equations
that characterize the speed and scale of propagation (in
the limit of large population size), providing insights on
how the parameters of a disease, e.g., its basic reproduc-
tive number, indicate whether a disease will die out, or
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an epidemic will emerge [5, 16].
In real-life, however, the spread of a disease is highly
dependent on the contact patterns between individuals.
In particular, a person may only infect those with whom
she interacts, and the number of contacts people have,
varies dramatically between individuals. These basic ob-
servations render the homogeneous mixing models inac-
curate, as they tend to underestimate the epidemic size in
the initial stages of the outbreak and overestimate it to-
wards the end [17]. As a result of the these shortcomings,
network epidemics has emerged as a mathematical mod-
eling approach that takes the underlying contact network
into consideration [1, 3, 18–20]. Since then, a large body
of research has looked into the delicate interplay between
the structural properties of the contact network and the
dynamics of propagation, leading to accurate predictions
of the spatio-temporal progression of disease outbreaks.
In addition to diseases, opinions and information also
propagate through networks in patterns similar to those
of epidemics [21]. Hence, research efforts on information
propagation draw on the theory of infectious diseases to
model the dynamics of propagation [8, 22–25]. Through-
out, we use the term spreading processes to denote the
spread of infectious diseases as well as information.
A common theme among the proposed models for net-
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2work epidemics is the assumption that the propagat-
ing object, i.e., a virus or a piece of information, is
transferred across the nodes without going through any
modification or evolution [5, 22, 23, 26–31]. However,
in real-life spreading processes, pathogens often evolve
in response to changing environments and medical in-
terventions [9, 32–35], and information is often modi-
fied by individuals before being forwarded [36, 37]. In
fact, 60% of the (approximately) 400 emerging infec-
tious diseases that have been identified since 1940 are
zoonotic [38] [39, 40]. A zoonotic disease is initially
poorly adapted, poorly replicated, and inefficiently trans-
mitted [41], hence its ability to go from animal-to-human
transmissions to human-to-human transmissions depends
on the pathogen evolving to a strain that is well-adapted
to the human host. For instance, genetic variations in
some critical genes were reported to be essential for the
transition from animal-to-human transmission to human-
to-human transmission in the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2002-2003 [42].
Similar patterns of evolution are observed in the way
information propagates among individuals. Needless to
say, one observes, on a daily basis, how information mu-
tates unintentionally, or perhaps intentionally by an ad-
versary, on social media platforms [36]. At a high-level,
an individual may mutate the information by exaggera-
tion, hoping for her variant to go viral. Mutations may
also occur unintentionally. In particular, Dawkins [43]
argued that ideas and information spread and evolve be-
tween individuals with patterns similar to genes, in a
sense that they self-replicate, mutate, and respond to
selective pressure as they interact with their host. Con-
cluding, if we are to ignore evolution, we underestimate
the severity of the epidemic and fail to understand the
intricate interplay between the dynamics of propagation
and evolution.
In this paper, we aim to bridge the disconnect be-
tween how spreading processes propagate and evolve in
real-life, and the current mathematical and simulation
models that do not capture evolution. In particular, we
investigate the evolution of spreading processes with the
aim of i) revealing the role of evolution on the threshold,
probability, and final size of epidemics; and ii) under-
standing the interplay between the structural properties
of the network and the process of evolution. Throughout,
we use the term epidemics to denote disease/information
outbreaks that result in a positive fraction of infected in-
dividuals in the limit of large network size and self-limited
outbreaks to denote small disease outbreaks for which the
fraction of infected individuals tends to zero in the limit
of large network size.
We develop a mathematical theory that draws on
the tools developed for analyzing the zero-temperature
random-field Ising model on Bethe lattices [44] as well as
on random graphs [45, 46]. Our mathematical theory un-
ravels the relationship between the characteristics of the
spreading process, the structure of the contact network
on which the process spreads, and evolution. In addi-
tion to the mathematical theory, we perform extensive
simulations on random and real-world networks to verify
our theory and reveal the significant shortcomings of the
classical mathematical models that do not capture evolu-
tion. In particular, we show that the classical, single-type
bond-percolation models [3, 47–49] may accurately pre-
dict the threshold and final size of epidemics, but their
predictions on the probability of emergence are signif-
icantly inaccurate on both random and real-world net-
works. This inaccuracy sheds the light on a fundamen-
tal disconnect between the classical single-type, bond-
percolation models and real-life spreading processes that
entail evolution.
In modeling the evolution of spreading processes, we
adopt the multiple-strain model that was introduced by
Alexander and Day in [33]. Their model can be briefly
outlined as follows (more details are given in Section III).
Consider a multiple-strain spreading process that starts
with an individual, i.e., the seed, receiving infection
(from an external reservoir) with strain-1 of a particular
pathogen. The seed infects each of her contacts indepen-
dently with probability T1, called the transmissibility of
strain-1. Once a susceptible individual receives the infec-
tion from the seed, the pathogen may evolve within that
new host prior to any subsequent infections. In particu-
lar, the pathogen may remain as strain-1 with probability
µ11 or mutate to strain-2 (that has transmissibility T2)
with probability µ12 = 1− µ11. If the pathogen remains
as strain-1 (respectively, mutates to strain-2), then the
host infects each of her susceptible neighbors in the sub-
sequent stages independently with probability T1 (respec-
tively, T2). In the subsequent stages, if any susceptible
individual receives strain-1, the pathogen may remain as
strain-1 with probability µ11 or mutate to strain-2 with
probability µ12 = 1− µ11 prior to subsequent infections.
Similarly, if any susceptible individual receives strain-2,
the pathogen may remain as strain-2 with probability
µ22 or mutate to strain-1 with probability µ21 = 1− µ22
prior to subsequent infections. The process continues to
grow until no additional infections are possible. We re-
mark that it is straightforward to extend the model to
the general case, where there are m possible strains for
some finite integer m ≥ 2. More details are given in
Section IV.
We start by considering the case where co-infection is
not possible, i.e., each infected host either carries strain-
1 or strain-2, but not both. Existing research on simi-
lar model [33] only explores the probability of epidemics,
but lacks any insights on the expected epidemic size (de-
noted by S) or, more precisely, the expected fraction of
individuals infected by each strain (denoted by S1 and
S2, respectively). We present a mathematical theory that
accurately predicts the epidemic threshold, expected epi-
demic size and the expected fraction of individuals in-
fected by each strain as functions of the characteristics
of the spreading process (i.e., T1 and T2), evolution (i.e.,
µ11 and µ22), and the structure of the underlying contact
network (e.g., its degree distribution). We perform ex-
3tensive simulations on random graphs with arbitrary de-
gree distributions (generated by the configuration model
[50–52]) as well as with real-world networks (obtained
from SNAP dataset [53]) to verify our theory and reveal
the significant shortcomings of the classical mathematical
models that do not account for evolution.
Finally, we explore the case where co-infection is pos-
sible. In particular, a susceptible individual who gets in-
fected with strain-1 and strain-2 simultaneously becomes
co-infected, and starts to transmit the co-infection with
transmissibility Tco. We show that co-infection gives rise
to a rich set of dynamics: it can amplify or inhibit the
spreading dynamics, and more remarkably lead the order
of phase transition to change from second-order to first-
order. We investigate the interplay between the network
structure, mutation schemes, and co-infection dynamics
and reveal the cases where such interplay induces first-
order phase transitions for the expected epidemic size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we survey the related work on evolution and co-
infection. In Section III, we present the multiple-strain
model for evolution and demonstrate how we model the
underlying contact network. In Section IV, we present
and derive the main results of this work, while in Sec-
tion V, we confirm our theoretical results via computer
simulations. We empirically consider the case where co-
infection is possible in Section VII. In Section VI, we
consider evolution on real-world networks obtained from
SNAP dataset [53] and reveal the significant shortcom-
ings of the classical mathematical models that do not
capture evolution. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A large body of research has investigated the role of
evolutionary adaptations in enabling pathogen establish-
ment in human populations [9, 35, 40, 42, 54, 55]. A
pronounced example of such evolutionary adaptations is
the emergence of zoonoses. In particular, zoonotic dis-
eases are poorly adapted and inefficiently transmitted at
first [41], yet they may eventually (through evolution-
ary adaptations) cross the species barrier and start to
spread from human to human. In fact, a key event that
is thought to have caused the emergence of the 1918
H1N1 pandemic is a recombination in the hemagglutinin
gene that resulted in a novel virus with increased viru-
lence [56]. Other evolutionary adaptations include ge-
netic changes (e.g., Salmonella enterica), recombination
or reassortment (e.g., H5N1 influenza), and hybridization
(e.g., Phytophthora alni) [54].
To date, most of the research studies on the evolu-
tion of infectious diseases either assume a homogeneous-
mixing host population, or focus entirely on the ecological
or environmental factors of pathogen evolution. Indeed,
the recent advances in network epidemics pave the way
for exploring new depths and revealing new insights on
the delicate interplay between the structural properties
of the host contact network and the process of evolution.
In what follows, we review the recent progress in creat-
ing a modeling framework that captures the spread and
evolution of infectious diseases on realistic host contact
networks.
In [33], Alexander and Day proposed a network-based
framework that characterizes the spread and evolution
of an introduced pathogen on a contact network. Their
main objective was to investigate the probability of
emergence, and its relation to mutation probabilities,
pathogens’ transmissibilities, and the structure of the un-
derlying contact network. Using a multi-type branching
process [57, 58], they derived recursive relations govern-
ing the probability of emergence for a given initial strain
of the pathogen. The initial strain was assumed to have
a poor transmissibility, hence, evolution to a strain with
sufficient transmissibility was necessary for emergence.
Alexander and Day explored the potential risk factors
that could lead to such evolutionary emergence of the
pathogen. In particular, they showed that for a given
transmissibility, heterogeneity in network structure can
significantly increase the risk of emergence. Moreover,
certain mutational schemes (e.g., reverse mutation) have
limited impact on the probability of emergence, while
others (e.g., simultaneous point mutations or recombina-
tion) have a dramatic effect on the probability of emer-
gence.
When the timescale of evolution is longer than the
timescale of propagation, pathogen evolution might oc-
cur after the original pathogen has invaded the popula-
tion. In [32], Leventhal et al. considered an SIS process
that starts with a pathogen (of single-strain) invading the
population. As the disease reaches an endemic equilib-
rium, a second strain of the disease appears in a random
infected individual. Authors assumed that co-infection
is not possible, i.e., an infected host carries either strain-
1 or strain-2, but not both. Moreover, hosts infected
by either strain have perfect immunity against the other
strain. Authors investigated the probability that the sec-
ond strain invades the population and drives the resident
strain to extinction, i.e., the fixation probability. Results
from both theoretical and real-world networks suggested
that the heterogeneity in network structure (which facili-
tated the spread of the resident strain) lowers the fixation
probability, hence enhancing the resiliency of the resident
strain to invasion by new variants.
The aforementioned studies consider the case when co-
infection is not possible, hence an individual can be in-
fected by only one strain. However, humans, animals,
plants, and other organisms may become co-infected with
multiple pathogen strains or species [59]. In [60], Cai
et al. considered the case when two pathogen strains
are spreading on the same contact network. A suscep-
tible host that has not been exposed to either strain
has probability p to get infected by an infective neigh-
bor. Note that the infection probabilities are the same
for both strains. Infected hosts recover after exactly one
4time step, and gain immunity against the strain that they
were infected with, but not the other strain. A host that
has been infected by one strain (being still active or has
already recovered) has a probability q (with q > p) to
get infected by the other strain, i.e., an infection with
one strain weakens the immune system of the infected
individual and makes her more susceptible to the second
strain. Cai et al. revealed that co-infection dynamics
could give rise to a hybrid phase transition, where the
probability of emergence exhibits a second-order transi-
tion, while the fraction of doubly infected nodes exhibits
a first-order transition.
In Section VII, we consider the case when co-infection
is possible, but in a way that differs from the approach
given by Cai et al. In particular, the epidemic pro-
cess in [60] i) does not entail any mutation events and
ii) starts with a doubly infected seed, i.e., an infected
host that initially carries both strain-1 and strain-2 of
the pathogen. However, we consider the case when the
seed is infected only with strain-1, hence the emergence
of strain-2 (which is dictated by the underlying muta-
tional scheme, transmissibility, and network structure) is
a perquisite for co-infection. Moreover, our co-infection
process differs fundamentally in the way a host becomes
co-infected. Unlike the model given in [60], we assume a
perfect cross-immunity, i.e., a host that has recovered
from strain-1 develops immunity against both strain-1
and strain-2. Hence, the only pathway for co-infection
is when a susceptible host is exposed simultaneously to
one or more infections of strain-1 and one or more infec-
tions of strain-2. Finally, our model differs in the stage
that follows co-infection. Namely, once a host becomes
co-infected, she starts to spread the co-infection, i.e., the
mixture of the two pathogen strains. In contrast, a co-
infected host in [60] spreads each strain independently
with a probability that corresponds to the state of her
neighbor; see [60] for more details.
III. MODEL DEFINITIONS
A. A multiple-strain model for evolution
In [33], Alexander and Day proposed a multiple-strain
model that accounts for evolution. Their model is cap-
tured by two matrices, namely, the transmissibility ma-
trix T and the mutation matrix µ, both with dimensions
m × m for a finite integer m ≥ 2 denoting the number
of possible strains. The transmissibility matrix T is a
m×m diagonal matrix, with [Ti] representing the trans-
missibility of strain-i, i.e.,
T =

T1 0 . . . 0
0 T2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Tm
 .
The mutation matrix µ is a m × m matrix with µij
denoting the probability that strain-i mutates to strain-
j. Note that
∑
j µij = 1, hence µ is a row-stochastic
matrix. One example for the transmissibility and mu-
tation matrices was given by Antia et al. in [34], where
the fitness landscape consisted of m strains, with strain-1
through m−1 having identical transmissibility such that
R0,i < 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m−1, with R0,i denoting the basic
reproductive number of strain-i. Strain-m has transmis-
sibility Tm such that R0,m > 1, hence the emergence of
the pathogen requires evolution from strain-1 to strain-
m. Antia et al. considered the the so-called one-step
irreversible mutation [33, 34] where the pathogen must
acquire m− 1 mutations (in order and one at a time) to
evolve to strain-m , i.e.,
T =

T1 0 0 . . . 0
0 T1 0 . . . 0
0 0 T1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 Tm

and
µ =

1− µ µ 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 1− µ µ . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 0 1− µ µ
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

The multiple-strain model proposed by Alexander and
Day [33] works as follows. Consider a spreading process
that starts with an individual, i.e., the seed, receiving
infection with strain-1 from an external reservoir. Since
strain-1 has transmissibility T1, the seed infects each of
her contacts independently with probability T1. Once
a susceptible individual receives the infection from the
seed, the pathogen may evolve within that new host prior
to any subsequent infections. In particular, the pathogen
may remain as strain-1 with probability µ11 or mutate
to strain-i (that has transmissibility Ti) with probability
µ1i for i = 2, . . . ,m. If the pathogen remains as strain-
1 (respectively, mutates to strain-i), then the host in-
fects each of her susceptible neighbors in the subsequent
stages independently with probability T1 (respectively,
Ti). Observe that as the process continues to grow, mul-
tiple strains may coexist in the population as governed
by the transmissibility matrix T and the mutation matrix
µ. At an intermediate stage, if any susceptible individ-
ual receives strain-j, the pathogen may remain as strain-j
with probability µjj or mutate to strain-` with probabil-
ity µj` for ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ {j} prior to subsequent
infections. The process terminates when no additional
infections are possible. A graphical illustration for the
case when m = 2 is given in Figure 1. In this paper, we
focus on the case where m = 2, however, it is straight-
forward to extend our theory to handle the general case
with m strains. More details are given in Section IV.
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FIG. 1. The multiple-strain model for evolution. (a) The process starts with a single individual, i.e., the seed, receiving
infection with strain-1 (highlighted in orange) from an external reservoir. (b) The seed infects each of her susceptible neighbors
(highlighted in green) independently with probability T1. (c) The pathogen mutates independently within hosts. The pathogen
remains as strain-1 with probability µ11 or mutates to strain-2 (highlighted in blue) with probability µ12. (d) Individuals
whose pathogen has mutated to strain-i infect their neighbors independently with probability Ti. (e) The pathogen mutates
independently within hosts. The pathogen remains as strain-2 with probability µ22 or mutates to strain-1 with probability µ21.
B. Network Model: Random graphs with arbitrary
degree distribution
Let G denote the underlying contact network, defined
on the node set N = {1, . . . , n}. We define the structure
of G through its degree distribution {pk}. In particular,
{pk, k = 0, 1, . . .} gives the probability that an arbitrary
node in G has degree k. We generate the network G
according to the configuration model [50, 51], i.e., the
degrees of nodes in G are all drawn independently from
the distribution {pk, k = 0, 1, . . .}. Furthermore, we as-
sume that the degree distribution is well-behaved in the
sense that all moments of arbitrary order are finite. Of
particular importance in the context of the configura-
tion model is the degree distribution of a randomly cho-
sen neighbor of a randomly chosen vertex, denoted by
{pˆk, k = 1, 2, . . .}, and given by
pˆk =
kpk
〈k〉 , k = 1, 2, . . .
where 〈k〉 denotes the mean degree, i.e., 〈k〉 = ∑k kpk.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Probability of Emergence
The analysis of the probability of emergence was es-
tablished by Alexander and Day in [33]. Below, we
give a brief summary of their results for completeness.
Their approach is based on a multi-type branching pro-
cess [57, 58] that starts with an initial infective of a par-
ticular type, e.g., type-1, and then proceeds by infecting
each of her neighbors independently with some proba-
bility that is characterized by the infecting strain. Each
of the infected neighbors mutate independently with a
probability that is also characterized by the infecting
strain. The process proceeds similarly for subsequent
stages. Clearly, the process differs from the standard
Single-Type Branching Process in that individuals of dif-
ferent types may coexist in any generation (other than
generation 0), with different offspring distribution per
each type, hence the notion Multi-Type [57, 58].
Next, we summarize the results given by Alexander
and Day in [33]. Let γi (s1, s2, . . . , sm) be the probability
generating function (PGF) for the number of infections
of each type transmitted by an initial infective of type-i.
It holds that
γi (s1, s2, . . . , sm) = g
1− Ti + Ti m∑
j=1
µijsj
 ,
for i = 1, . . . ,m and with g (s) denoting the PGF of
the degree distribution; i.e., g (s) =
∑∞
k=0 pks
k. More-
over, with Γi (s1, s2, . . . , sm) denoting the PGF for the
number of infections of each type transmitted by a later-
generation infective of type-i (i.e., a typical intermediate
host in the process); it holds that
Γi (s1, s2, . . . , sm) = G
1− Ti + Ti m∑
j=1
µijsj
 ,
for i = 1, . . . ,m and with G (s) denoting the PGF of the
excess degree distribution; i.e.,
G (s) =
∞∑
k=1
kpk
〈k〉 s
k−1.
We remind that kpk/〈k〉 gives the probability that a ran-
domly chosen neighbor of a randomly chosen vertex has
degree k, and note that the excess degree is k − 1 since
one edge is already traversed to reach the node.
The probability of extinction starting from one later-
generation infective of type-i, denoted qi, is the smallest
6non-negative root of the equation qi = Γi (q1, . . . , qm)
solved simultaneously for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Fi-
nally, the overall extinction probability is given by
g
(
1− Ti + Ti
∑m
j=1 µijqj
)
if the whole process starts
with an initial infective of type-i. It was shown in [33]
that the above process resembles a multi-type branching
process with mean matrix [61] given by
M =
( 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
)
Tµ (1)
The theory of multi-type branching processes states
that if the dominant eigenvalue of M is less than or
equal to one, then the process goes extinct with prob-
ability 1. Otherwise, there is a positive probability of
non-extinction. Hence, the phase transition occurs when
ρ (M ) = 1, (2)
where ρ (M ) denotes the spectral radius, i.e., the largest
eigenvalue (in absolute value) of M .
B. Expected Epidemic Size
Our objective is to derive the expected epidemic size
S and the expected fraction of individuals infected by
each strain, i.e., S1, S2, . . . , Sm for m possible strains.
Note that S =
∑m
i=1 Si. Below, we provide analysis for
the case of two strains, but we later show how to ex-
tend our analysis to the general case with m strains, for
some finite integer m ≥ 2. We apply a tree-based ap-
proach that is based on the work by Gleeson [45, 46].
Their approach draws on the tools developed for ana-
lyzing the zero-temperature random-field Ising model on
Bethe lattices [44]. Note that as we build our network
using the configuration model, the network structure is
locally tree-like with the fraction of cycles approaching
zero in the limit of large network size [50–52].
Since G is locally tree-like, we can replace it by a tree
and arrange the vertices in a hierarchical structure, such
that at the top level, there is a single node (the root)
that has degree k with probability pk. Note that {pk}
is a proper degree distribution with
∑
k pk = 1. Each of
the k neighbors of the root has degree k′ with probability
k′pk′/〈k〉, where 〈k〉 denotes the mean degree of the net-
work. Furthermore, we label the levels of the tree from
level ` = 0 at the bottom to level ` =∞ at the top, i.e.,
the root.
We assume that nodes update their status starting
from the bottom of the tree and proceeding towards the
top. This gives rise to a delicate case, where a node at
some level ` may be exposed to simultaneous infections
by both strain-1 and strain-2 from her neighbors at level
` − 1. In the remainder of this section, we assume that
co-infection is not possible, hence a node that receives x
infections of strain-1 and y infections of strain-2 becomes
infected by strain-1 (respectively, by strain-2) with prob-
ability x/(x+y) (respectively, y/(x+y)). In Section VII,
we empirically consider the case where co-infection is pos-
sible, i.e., a node that receives simultaneous infections by
both strains becomes co-infected and starts to spread the
co-infection in the subsequent rounds. In this case, co-
infection may be modeled as an additional strain that has
transmissibility Tco and never mutates back to strain-1
or strain-2.
Throughout, we say that a node is either inactive if it
has not received any infection (i.e., still susceptible) or
active and type-i if it has been infected and then mutated
to strain-i, for i = 1, 2. With a slight abuse of nota-
tions, let q`+1,i be the probability that a node at level
` + 1, say node v, is active and type-i. Furthermore,
let q`+1 = q`+1,1 + q`+1,2, i.e., q`+1 is the total proba-
bility that a node at level ` + 1 is active. We start by
an arbitrary initial distribution for {q0,1, q0,2} satisfying
q0,1 > 0, q0,2 > 0. Then, we update the distribution
properly until we reach the root. Note that if the degree
of node v is k, then node v is using one edge to connect
to her parent at level `+ 2, and k−1 edges to connect to
her neighbors at level `. We can condition on the excess
degree (d˜) of node v to get
q`+1,i
=
∞∑
k=1
kpk
〈k〉 P
[
node v becomes active and type-i
∣∣∣∣ d˜ = k − 1]
Next, we further condition on the number of active
neighbors of type-1 and type-2. Note that we have a
Multinomial distribution for the number of active neigh-
bors of both types. In particular, a neighbor at level `
may be active and type-1 with probability q`,1, active and
type-2 with probability q`,2, or inactive with probability
1−q` = 1−q`,1−q`,2. Let Ii denote the number of active
neighbors of type-i. Thus,
q`+1,i =
∞∑
k=1
kpk
〈k〉
k−1∑
k1=0
k−1−k1∑
k2=0
(
k − 1
k1
)(
k − 1− k1
k2
)
(q`,1)
k1
· (q`,2)k2 (1− q`,1 − q`,2)k−1−k1−k2
· P [node v becomes active and type-i ∣∣ I1 = k1, I2 = k2]
Let X and Y denote the number of infections received
from type-1 and type-2 neighbors, respectively. Note that
conditioned on having k1 and k2 active neighbors of type-
1 and type-2, respectively, we have
X ∼ Binomial(k1, T1)
Y ∼ Binomial(k2, T2)
where Ti denotes the transmissibility of strain-i. Let
A := P
[
node v becomes active and type-i
∣∣ I1 = k1, I2 = k2]
Consider a particular realization (x, y) of the random
variables (X,Y ). Observe that if x > 0, y = 0, then node
v becomes infected by strain-1 and eventually mutates
7to type-i with probability µ1i. Similarly, if x = 0, y > 0,
then node v becomes infected by strain-2 and eventu-
ally mutates to type-i with probability µ2i. Finally, if
x > 0, y > 0, then node v becomes infected by strain-1
(respectively, strain-2) with probability x/(x+y) (respec-
tively, y/(x + y)) and eventually mutates to type-i with
probability µ1i (respectively, µ2i). Hence, by condition-
ing on X and Y , we have
A =
k1∑
x=0
k2∑
y=0
(
k1
x
)(
k2
y
)
T x1 T
y
2 (1− T1)k1−x(1− T2)k2−y·
· P [A ∣∣X = x, Y = y]
=
k1∑
x=0
k2∑
y=0
(
k1
x
)(
k2
y
)
T x1 T
y
2 (1− T1)k1−x(1− T2)k2−y·
·
(
µ1i1[x > 0, y = 0] + µ2i1[x = 0, y > 0]+
(
xµ1i
x+ y
+
yµ2i
x+ y
)
1[x > 0, y > 0]
)
Note that
k1∑
x=0
k2∑
y=0
(
k1
x
)(
k2
y
)
T x1 T
y
2 (1− T1)k1−x(1− T2)k2−y·
· µ1i1[x > 0, y = 0]
= µ1i(1− T2)k2 (1− P(X = 0))
= µ1ia2b1
where ai = (1− Ti)ki and bi = 1− ai. Similarly,
k1∑
x=0
k2∑
y=0
(
k1
x
)(
k2
y
)
T x1 T
y
2 (1− T1)k1−x(1− T2)k2−y·
· µ2i1[x = 0, y > 0] = µ2ia1b2
Thus, we have
q`+1,i =
∞∑
k=1
kpk
〈k〉
k−1∑
k1=0
k−1−k1∑
k2=0
(
k − 1
k1
)(
k − 1− k1
k2
)
(q`,1)
k1 (q`,2)
k2 (1− q`,1 − q`,2)k−1−k1−k2 ·
·
(
b1a2µ1i + a1b2µ2i +
k1∑
x=0
k2∑
y=0
(
k1
x
)(
k2
y
)
T x1 T
y
2 (1− T1)k1−x(1− T2)k2−y
(
xµ1i
x+ y
+
yµ2i
x+ y
)
1[x > 0, y > 0]
)
,
(3)
for ` = 0, 1, . . . and i = 1, 2.
Observe that under the assumption that nodes do not
become inactive once they turn active, the quantities q`,i
appearing in (3) are non-decreasing in `, and thus they
converge to a limit q∞,i for i = 1, 2. Finally, the final
fraction of nodes that are active and type-i is equal (in
expected value) to the probability that the root of the
tree (at level ` → ∞) is active and type-i. Note that if
the tree root has degree k, then all of these k edges will
be utilized to connect with her neighbors at the lower
level. Hence,
Qi =
∞∑
k=0
pk
k∑
k1=0
k−k1∑
k2=0
(
k
k1
)(
k − k1
k2
)
(q∞,1)
k1 (q∞,2)
k2 (1− q∞,1 − q∞,2)k−k1−k2 ·
·
(
b1a2µ1i + a1b2µ2i +
k1∑
x=0
k2∑
y=0
(
k1
x
)(
k2
y
)
T x1 T
y
2 (1− T1)k1−x(1− T2)k2−y
(
xµ1i
x+ y
+
yµ2i
x+ y
)
1[x > 0, y > 0]
)
(4)
where Qi for i = 1, 2 denotes the probability that the
tree root is active and type-i and q∞,i for i = 1, 2 is the
steady-state solution of the recursive equations (3). Note
that Q = Q1 + Q2 is the total probability that the tree
root is active.
Observe that q∞,1 = q∞,2 = 0 gives a trivial fixed-
point of the recursive equations (3). Indeed, this trivial
solution leads to Q = 0 by virtue of (4). Although the
trivial fixed point is a valid numerical solution for the
recursive equations (3), we can show that this trivial so-
8lution is unstable. Hence, another solution with q∞,1 > 0
and q∞,2 > 0 may exist. To test whether or not the triv-
ial fixed point is stable, we check the spectral radius of
the Jacobian matrix J (q`,1, q`,2) corresponding to the lin-
earization of (3) at q`,1 = q`,2 = 0. If the spectral radius
of the J (q`,1, q`,2) at q`,1 = q`,2 = 0 is larger than one,
then the trivial fixed-point is unstable, indicating that
there exists another solution with q∞,1 > 0 and q∞,2 > 0
implying the existence of a giant component. The Jaco-
bian matrix is given by
J (q`,1, q`,2)|q`,1=q`,2=0 =
[
∂q`+1,1
∂q`,1
∂q`+1,1
∂q`,2
∂q`+1,2
∂q`,1
∂q`+1,2
∂q`,2
]
q`,1=q`,2=0
=
( 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
)[
T1µ11 T2µ21
T1µ12 T2µ22
]
=
( 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
)
(Tµ)
T
Note that a square matrix and its transpose have the
same set of eigenvalues. Hence, the Jacobian matrix
admits the same spectral radius of (1) as would be ex-
pected, implying the same condition (2) for phase tran-
sition. Nevertheless, the generating functions approach
used by Alexander and Day [33] is useful in its own right
as it enables quantifying the probability of emergence.
We remark that it is straightforward to extend our
analysis to the general case with m strains, for some finite
integer m ≥ 2 as long as the underlying process is inde-
composable [33, 57, 58]. At a high level, indecomposable
processes are those for which each pathogen strain i even-
tually gives rise to strain-j at some generation nij ≥ 1 for
i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. In other words, if an indecomposable
process starts with an infection with strain-i, then as the
process continues to grow, all other strains will eventually
emerge. Such a property is established if, for every pair
of strains (i, j), there exists a positive integer nij such
that M nij (i, j) > 0 [33]. If the underlying process is de-
composable, then there exist classes of strain types such
that strain types belonging to the same class can even-
tually give rise to one another, but not to other strain
types. Indeed, the existence of multiple classes leads to
multiple solutions for the set of equations (4) depending
on the initial distribution of {q0,1, q0,2, . . . , q0,m}. Hence,
to guarantee the uniqueness of the solution of (4) and for
mathematical tractability, we limit our formalism to the
case when the underlying process is indecomposable.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. The Structure of the Contact Network
In this section, we consider synthetic contact networks
generated randomly by the configuration model, while
real-world networks are considered in Section VI. In par-
ticular, we consider contact networks with Poisson degree
distribution as well as Power-law degree distribution.
1. Poisson degree distribution
We start by considering contact networks with Poisson
degree distribution. Namely, with λ denoting the mean
degree, i.e., λ = 〈k〉, we have
pk = e
−λλ
k
k!
, k = 0, 1, . . .
In this case, condition (2) implies that phase transition
occurs when
λ× ρ (Tµ) = 1 (5)
where ρ (Tµ) denotes the spectral radius of the matrix
multiplication Tµ. Observe that condition (5) embodies
the structure of the contact network (represented by λ for
a contact network with Poisson degree distribution), the
characteristics of propagation (represented by the matrix
T ) and the process of evolution (represented by µ), hence
it unravels how these properties interact together to yield
an epidemic.
2. Power-law degree distribution
Poisson degree distribution provides a formalism for
homogeneous networks, where the degree sequence of the
graph is highly concentrated around the mean degree.
However, degree sequences in real-world networks were
observed to be heavily skewed to the right [1, 3, 7],
meaning that the distribution is heterogeneous, or heavy-
tailed. We consider Power-law degree distribution with
exponential cutoff since they are relevant to a variety of
real-world networks [3, 62]. In particular, we set
pk =
{
0 if k = 0(
Liγ
(
e−1/Γ
))−1
k−γe−k/Γ if k = 1, 2, . . . .
where γ and Γ are positive constants and Lim(z) is the
mth polylogarithm of z, i.e., Lim(z) =
∑∞
k=1
zk
km . Ob-
serve that condition (2) now translates to(
Liγ−2
(
e−1/Γ
)− Liγ−1 (e−1/Γ)
Liγ−1
(
e−1/Γ
) )× ρ (Tµ) = 1 (6)
Similar to (5), condition (6) indicates how the struc-
ture of the underlying network, the characteristics of
propagation, and the process of evolution are intertwined
together, and under what conditions their relationship
would induce an epidemic.
B. Notations and Methods
Notations: In what follows, we use S, S1 and S2 to de-
note the total expected epidemic size, the expected frac-
tion of nodes infected with strain-1, and the expected
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FIG. 2. Evolution on Poisson and Power-law contact networks. The network size n is 2 × 105 and the number of
independent experiments for each data point is 500. Blue circles, brown plus signs, and green triangles denote the empirical
average epidemic size, average fraction of nodes infected with strain-1, and average fraction of nodes infected with strain-2,
respectively. The red, blue, and yellow lines denote the theoretical average total epidemic size, average fraction of nodes infected
with strain-1, and average fraction of nodes infected with strain-2, respectively. Theoretical results are obtained by solving the
system of equations (4) with the corresponding parameter set. (a)-(b) We set T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, µ11 = µ22 = 0.75. (c)-(d)
We set T1 = 0.4, T2 = 0.8, and µ11 = 0.3, and µ22 = 0.7 implying that an infected node, regardless of what type of infection it
has, mutates to strain-1 (respectively, strain-2) with probability 0.3 (respectively, 0.7), independently. In all cases, we observe
good agreement with our theoretical results.
.
fraction of nodes infected with strain-2, respectively and
all at the steady state, i.e., when the process terminates.
We use PBP1 and P
BP
2 to denote the probability of emer-
gence on a single-strain bond-percolated network with
T1 and the probability of emergence on a single-strain
bond-percolated network with T2, respectively.
Methods: We use the configuration model to create
random random graphs with particular degree distribu-
tions. In particular, we sample a degree sequence from
the corresponding distribution, then we use the config-
uration model to construct a random graph with that
degree sequence. We use igraph [63] on both C++ and
Python for simulations. Our simulation codes are avail-
able online [64]. Unless otherwise stated, we start the
process by selecting a node uniformly at random and in-
fecting it with strain-1. The node infects each neighbor
independently with probability T1. Each of the infected
neighbors mutate independently to strain-1 with prob-
ability µ11, or to strain-2 with probability µ12. As the
process continues to grow, both strains might exist in the
population. An intermediate node that becomes infected
with strain-i would mutate to strain-1 with probability
µi1, or strain-2 with probability µi2, for i = 1, 2. When
cycles start to appear, a susceptible node could be ex-
posed to multiple infections at once. If a node is exposed
to x infections of strain-1 and y infections of strain-2
simultaneously, the node becomes infected with strain-1
(respectively, strain-2) with probability x/(x+y) (respec-
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tively, y/(x + y)) for any non-negative constants x and
y. A node that receives infection at round i mutate first
(by the end of round i) before it attempts to infect her
neighbors at round i + 1. The node is considered recov-
ered at round i + 2, i.e., a node is infective for only one
round.
C. Epidemic Size
We start by focusing on the total epidemic size and the
expected fraction of nodes that were infected with strain-
1 and strain-2. The network size n is set to 2× 105. We
consider two parameter sets that emphasize the corre-
lations between a node’s eventual type (after mutation)
and the type of infection it has originally received. In
particular, we have
- Parameter set 1: T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, µ11 = 0.75,
and µ22 = 0.75.
- Parameter set 2: T1 = 0.4, T2 = 0.8, µ11 = 0.3,
and µ22 = 0.7.
Observe that we have µ11 = µ21 and µ22 = µ12 for the
second parameter set. Hence, an infected node, regard-
less of what type of infection it has, mutates to strain-1
(respectively, strain-2) with probability 0.3 (respectively,
0.7), independently. This is a special case that can easily
be treated by our formalism given in Section IV.
In Figure 2a and Figure 2b, we use the first param-
eter set and run 500 independent experiments for each
data point. We demonstrate our results on contact net-
works with Poisson degree distribution (Figure 2a) and
Power-law degree distribution with exponential cutoff
(Figure 2b). For Figure 2b, we set Γ = 15, and vary
γ with the mean degree. In particular, the mean degree
λ is given by
λ =
Liγ−1
(
e−1/Γ
)
Liγ
(
e−1/Γ
) . (7)
Hence, we can numerically solve (7) to obtain the partic-
ular value of γ corresponding to a given value of λ.
In order to establish the validity of our analytic results
given in Section IV, we plot the theoretical values of S,
S1, and S2 obtained by solving the system of equations
(4) with the corresponding parameter set. We also plot a
vertical line at the critical mean degree that corresponds
to a phase transition (see (5) and (6)). Clearly, our ex-
perimental results are in perfect agreement with our the-
oretical results on both contact networks. In Figure 2c
and Figure 2d, we repeat the same procedure, but with
the second parameter set. Similarly, we observe perfect
agreement with our theoretical results on both contact
networks.
D. Probability of Emergence
In [33], Alexander and Day investigated the probabil-
ity of emergence for the multiple strain model presented
in Section III. However, authors did not provide a com-
prehensive simulation study to validate their formalism
on random or real-world networks. Instead, in [33, Sec-
tion 3], authors only evaluated their equations numeri-
cally. In this subsection, we aim to establish the valid-
ity of the results presented in [33] on random networks
generated by the configuration model. For brevity, we
limit our scope to contact networks with Poisson degree
distribution. However, similar patterns are observed for
contact networks with Power-law degree distribution.
In Figure 3, we set the network size n = 5×105 and run
a computer simulation with 104 independent experiment
for each data point. We use the two parameter sets given
in Section IV.C. Namely, we set
- T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, and µ11 = µ22 = 0.75 for
Figure 3.a, and
- T1 = 0.4, T2 = 0.8, µ11 = 0.3 and µ22 = 0.7 for
Figure 3.b.
Note that in Figure 3, we plot the probability of emer-
gence conditioned on the initial node receiving infection
with strain-1 [65]. We observe an agreement between our
experimental results and the theoretical results given in
[33]. The reasoning behind this is intuitive; the multi-
type branching framework assumes that the underlying
graph is tree-like, an assumption that works best for
networks with vanishingly small clustering coefficient,
e.g., networks which are generated by the configuration
model.
E. Reduction to Single-Type Bond-Percolation
An important question to ask is whether the classical
single-type bond percolation models could predict the
threshold, probability, and final size of epidemics that
entail evolution, i.e., information or diseases that propa-
gate according to the multiple-strain model given in Sec-
tion III. In pursing an answer to this question, we start by
establishing a matching condition between single-strain
models and multiple-strain models for epidemics.
In [3], Newman proposed a stochastic SIR model for
the propagation of a single-strain pathogen on a contact
network. Newman showed that, under some conditions,
the SIR model is isomorphic to a bond-percolation model
on the underlying contact network. Specifically, with the
average transmissibility of the pathogen (denoted TBP)
as the bond-percolation parameter, if we are to occupy
each edge of the network with probability TBP, then the
probability of emergence as well as the final size of the
epidemic are precisely given by the fraction of nodes in
the giant component of the percolated graph. Finally, it
11
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FIG. 3. The probability of emergence on contact networks with Poisson degree distribution. The network size n
is 5 × 105 and the number of independent experiments for data point is 104. Blue circles denote the empirical probability of
emergence while the red line denotes the theoretical probability of emergence according to [33]. (a) We set T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5,
µ11 = µ22 = 0.75. (b) We set T1 = 0.4, T2 = 0.8, and µ11 = 0.3, and µ22 = 0.7. Our experimental results prove the validity of
the formalism presented by Alexander and Day in [33]
.
was shown that a phase transition occurs when( 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
)
TBP = 1 (8)
In other words, if the left hand side of (8) is strictly
larger than 1, a giant component emerges indicating an
epidemic. Otherwise, we have self-limited outbreaks.
Comparing (2) to (8) suggests the proposal of a match-
ing that results in the same condition for phase transi-
tion. More precisely, if we are to set
TBP = ρ (Tµ) (9)
then, both (2) and (8) collapse to the same condition for
a given contact network. In what follows, we explore the
extent to which classical, single-type bond-percolation
models (under the matching condition (9)) may predict
the threshold, probability, and final size of epidemics that
entail evolution, i.e., information or diseases that propa-
gate according to the multiple-strain model given in Sec-
tion III. We focus on contact networks with Poisson de-
gree distribution, generated by the configuration model,
while we devote Section VI for real-world networks.
In Figure 4, we extend Figure 3 by further adding the
experimental results for the final epidemic size as well
as the corresponding theoretical values for the proba-
bility of emergence on a bond-percolated network un-
der the matching condition (9). Note that the probabil-
ity of emergence is equivalent to the final epidemic size
for single-type, bond-percolated networks [3]. Observe
that the classical single-type bond-percolation model ac-
curately captures the threshold and final size of epidemic
but provides significantly inaccurate predictions when it
comes to the probability of emergence. Similar pattern
will be observed in Section VI for real-world networks.
This inaccuracy sheds the light on a fundamental discon-
nect between the classical, single-type bond-percolation
models and real-life spreading processes that entail evo-
lution. We explain the intuition behind our findings in
Appendix A.
F. Effect of Mutation
When only a single evolutionary pathway is available,
mutations have to occur in a particular order [66]. In
[34], Antia et al. considered the case where the fitness
landscape consists of m strains such that R0,i < 1 for
i = 1, . . . ,m − 1, while R0,m > 1. Hence, an introduced
pathogen (with R0,1 < 1) must acquire m− 1 successive
mutations in order for the disease to emerge. Antia et al.
derived a set of recursive equations whose solution char-
acterizes the probability of emergence under some condi-
tions; see [34] for more details. To gain further insights
on the effect of mutation, Antia et al. proposed a theo-
retical approximation of the probability of emergence as
a product of the probability of mutation, i.e., the prob-
ability that the introduced pathogen would eventually
mutate to strain-m, and the probability of emergence of
strain-m. Indeed, the probability of mutation plays a
key role in the overall extinction probability. After all, if
the introduced pathogen does not gain m− 1 successive
mutations, the disease would eventually die out.
Recall that the mathematical theory developed by
Alexander and Day [33] defines the probability of emer-
gence as a function of the evolutionary dynamics of the
pathogen (i.e., the mutation matrix µ), the characteris-
tics of the spreading process (i.e., the transmissibility ma-
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FIG. 4. Reduction to single-type bond-percolation. The network size n is 5 × 105 and the number of independent
experiments for each data point is 104. Blue circles and brown plus signs denote the empirical average epidemic size and the
probability of emergence, respectively. The navy blue line denotes the theoretical probability of emergence according to [33]
while the red line denotes the theoretical average epidemic size (as well as the probability of emergence) predicted by the
single-type bond-percolation framework under the matching condition (9). (a) We set T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, µ11 = µ22 = 0.75.
(b) We set T1 = 0.4, T2 = 0.8, and µ11 = 0.3, and µ22 = 0.7. The classical, single-type bond percolation models may accurately
predict the threshold and final size of epidemics, but their predictions on the probability of emergence are clearly inaccurate.
trix T ), and the structure of the underlying contact net-
work (i.e., the degree distribution {pk, k = 0, 1, . . .}).
All of these factors are intertwined together in a way that
makes it difficult to predict how the probability of mu-
tation influences the probability of emergence. In what
follows, we provide a theoretical approximation to the
probability of emergence in a way that clearly distin-
guishes the role of mutation and shows how it strongly
influences the probability of emergence.
Consider the case when the fitness landscape consists
of two strains with transmissibility matrix T and muta-
tion matrix µ given by
T =
[
T1 0
0 T2
]
and µ =
[
1− µ µ
0 1
]
.
Assume also that T1 < T2. Note that the process starts
by picking a random individual uniformly at random and
infecting her with strain-1. Fix the mean degree of the
underlying network to λ. Let λ1 and λ2 denote the phase
transition points (i.e., critical mean degrees) for a single-
strain, bond-percolated network with T1 and T2, respec-
tively. Observe that ρ (Tµ) = T2, hence, in view of (2),
the phase transition is entirely controlled by the param-
eters of strain-2, i.e., the phase transition occurs at λ2.
Indeed, we can conclude from (2) that for λ < λ2, the
probability of emergence is zero (in the limit of large net-
work size). We can write
P [emergence] (10)
= P
[
emergence
∣∣ at least one mutation]× Pµ
+ P
[
emergence
∣∣ no mutation]× (1− Pµ)
where Pµ denotes the probability that at some point
along the chain of infections (starting from the type-1
seed), a node would be infected by strain-1, but then mu-
tate to strain-2. In other words, Pµ captures the proba-
bility that at some point during the propagation, a type-2
node would emerge.
Observe that for λ < λ1, we have
P
[
emergence
∣∣ no mutation] = 0 in the limit of large
network size (since PBP1 = 0 on this interval), while for
λ ≥ λ1, we have Pµ = 1 in the limit of large network
size [67]. Hence, the second term in (10) is always zero
in the limit of large network size, leading to
P [emergence]
= P
[
emergence
∣∣ at least one mutation]× Pµ
Note that on the range λ2 ≤ λ < λ1, we have
P
[
emergence
∣∣ at least one mutation] = PBP2 . However,
on the range λ ≥ λ1, strain-1 nodes are able to form
a giant component on their own. Hence, in the cases
where a strain-2 node emerges at some point, but fails
to infect any of her neighbors, strain-1 nodes could
still trigger the emergence of the disease. It follows
that P
[
emergence
∣∣ at least one mutation] ≥ PBP2 on the
range λ ≥ λ2. Note that the bound is tight whenever
T2 is significantly larger than T1. The reasoning behind
this can be explained as follows. Whenever T2 is signif-
icantly larger than T1, the average number of secondary
infections of strain-2 would be much larger than that of
strain-1. Hence, infections with strain-2 would propagate
much faster and block potential pathways for strain-1 to
propagate. In this case, the overall probability of emer-
gence becomes tightly controlled by PBP2 . Next, we turn
13
our attention to deriving Pµ.
Consider a tree of infections that starts with a single
node infected with strain-1. Let H be the probability
that strain-2 never appears throughout the tree, i.e., H
is the probability that the tree of infections starting from
the seed does not give rise to strain-2 at any intermediate
point. Similarly, let h be the probability that a subtree of
infections starting from a type-1 host does not give rise
to strain-2 at any intermediate point. Recall that G(.)
gives the PGF of the excess degree distribution while g(.)
gives the PGF of the degree distribution. By conditioning
on the excess degree as well the number of secondary
infections, we get
h =
∞∑
k=1
kpk
〈k〉
k−1∑
x=0
(
k − 1
x
)
(T1 (1− µ))x (1− T1)k−1−x hx
=
∞∑
k=1
kpk
〈k〉 (1− T1 + T1 (1− µ)h)
k−1
= G (1− T1 + T1 (1− µ)h) (11)
The validity of (11) can be explained as follows. Note
that the root of any subtree, say node v, has already
used an edge to receive an infection with strain-1 from
her parent. Hence, if the degree of node v is k, then node
v is only using k−1 edges to infect her offspring, leading
us to use the excess degree distribution. Furthermore,
conditioned on the excess degree being k−1, the number
of secondary infections of each type generated by node v
is given by a multinomial distribution characterized by
(k− 1, T1(1− µ), T1µ, 1− T1). In particular, conditioned
on node v being type-1 and having an excess degree of
k− 1, the probability of generating x infections of type-1
and y infections of type-2 is given by(
k − 1
x
)(
k − 1− x
y
)
(T1 (1− µ))x (T1µ)y (1− T1)k−1−x−y
However, the only relevant term for the computation of
h is the one with y = 0, as all other terms with y > 0 are
contributing with a zero probability to h by definition.
Finally, hx denotes the probability that the subtrees em-
anating from the current x offspring are themselves free
of any strain-2 node.
Recall that H denotes the probability that strain-2
never appears throughout the tree (starting from the
root) and note that if the tree root has degree k, then
all of these k edges will be utilized to connect with her
neighbors at the lower level. Hence, in view of (11), we
can write
H = g (1− T1 + T1 (1− µ)h∞)
where h∞ denotes the steady-state solution of (11). It is
now immediate that Pµ = 1−H, leading to
P [emergence] ≥ (1−H)PBP2 (12)
To confirm the validity of (12), we run a computer
simulation on random networks generated by the con-
figuration model with Poisson degree distribution. In
Figure 5, we set the network size n = 2 × 105 and per-
form 104 independent experiments for each data point.
In Figure 5a, we set T1 = 0.1, T2 = 1, and µ = 0.01.
Observe that the bound given by (12) is tight, as T2 is
significantly larger than T1. In general, we would expect
a tight bound whenever λ2 ≤ λ < λ1 (i.e., 1 ≤ λ < 10 for
the given parameter set). As λ increases beyond λ1, the
tightness of the bound depends on the ratio between T2
to T1. This is illustrated in Figure 5b for the case when
T1 = 0.2 and T2 = 0.3.
The availability of an explicit expression for the proba-
bility of mutation allows for exploring the effects of muta-
tion on the overall probability of emergence. Indeed, the
way the probability of emergence behaves with respect to
changes in the mean degree resembles, to a great extent,
the way Pµ behaves, as illustrated in Figure 5. Hence,
in what follows, we focus on the behavior of Pµ with re-
spect to changes in the mean degree. In Figure 6, we set
T1 = 0.1 and plot Pµ against the mean degree for a net-
work with Poisson degree distribution. We observe that
different values for µ impacts the shape of Pµ (hence, the
probability of emergence) in a remarkable way. Firstly,
for all values of µ ∈ (0, 1), the behavior of Pµ appears
to be strikingly different than the universality class of
percolation models, e.g., see the shape of the probability
of emergence (respectively, PB2 ) in Figure 3 (respectively,
Figure 5). Secondly, the effect of mutation probabilities
on Pµ appears to be significant as the mean degree in-
creases from small values, reaches its peak right before
the critical mean degree corresponding to PBP1 , then de-
cays as the mean degree increases further.
The reasoning behind the aforementioned observation
is intuitive. Recall that the process starts with a sin-
gle infection with strain-1 and note that Pµ is influenced
by the structure of the underlying contact network, the
transmissibility of strain-1, and the particular value of
µ. As the mean degree λ increases towards λ1, the
length of the tree of infections starting from the seed
[68] also increases, however, no cycles appear and the
epidemic propagates on a finite, tree-like percolated net-
work (since λ < λ1). Increasing the length of the tree
increases the probability that at least one intermediate
node would mutate to strain-2, but the fact that the tree
is finite makes the particular value of µ very crucial to Pµ.
Namely, a small value of µ makes it less likely that a mu-
tant emerges before the chain of infections is terminated,
while a relatively larger value could drive the emergence
of strain-2 and lead the epidemic to escape extinction.
Put differently, the finiteness of the chain of infections
when λ < λ1 creates a limited number of opportunities
for mutation, causing the particular value of µ to bear the
burden of generating a mutant and driving the whole pro-
cess to emergence. However, as λ increases beyond λ1,
cycles start to appear and a giant component of nodes
infected with strain-1 emerges. In this case, the chain of
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FIG. 5. Approximating the probability of emergence: The network size n is 2 × 105 and the number of independent
experiments for each data point is 104. Blue circles denote the empirical probability of emergence while the red line denotes the
theoretical approximation of the probability of emergence according to (12). The light blue dashed line denotes the probability
of emergence for a single-strain, bond-percolated network with T2. (a) We set T1 = 0.1, T2 = 1, and µ = 0.01. (b) We
set T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.3, and µ = 0.01. We observe a good agreement between the experimental results and the theoretical
approximation given by (12) whenever λ2 ≤ λ < λ1 or whenever T2 is significantly larger than T1.
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FIG. 6. Effect of Mutation: We set T1 = 0.1 and plot the
behavior of Pµ against the mean degree for a network with
Poisson degree distribution. Intuitively, different values of µ
have different impact on Pµ. The impact is pronounced be-
fore the critical mean degree corresponding to a single-strain,
bond-percolated network with T1. Inset: The difference be-
tween the value of Pµ when µ = 0.4 and the value of Pµ when
µ = 0.01 as a function of the mean degree of the underlying
contact network.
infections is no longer finite, and any positive value of µ
results in a mutation almost surely in the limit of large
network size. Put differently, when λ ≥ λ1, the structure
of the underlying network starts to facilitate the emer-
gence of strain-2, hence reducing the dependence on µ.
VI. EVOLUTION IN REAL-WORLD
NETWORKS
In Section V.F, we explored the validity of analyzing
the multiple-strain model for evolution with the avail-
able tools from the classical, single-type bond-percolation
framework. We focused on random networks generated
by the configuration model and demonstrated that a
reduction to the classical, single-type bond percolation
framework leads to accurate results with respect to the
threshold and final size of epidemics, but significantly in-
accurate results with respect to the probability of emer-
gence. In this section, we aim to examine the univer-
sality of our findings by analyzing the probability of
emergence on real-world contact networks obtained from
SNAP data sets [53]. Our objective is twofold. Firstly,
we would like to validate the multi-type branching for-
malism of Alexander and Day (see Section IV.A) on real-
world networks. Secondly, we seek to highlight and con-
firm the limitations of the single-type bond-percolation
framework in predicting the probability of emergence on
real-world networks.
A. Dataset
We consider four different contact networks obtained
from SNAP [53]. In particular, we consider the following
data sets:
- Facebook [53, 69]: The contact network among
the friends of 10 users (including those 10 users).
The network consists of 4, 039 users and 88, 234
edges.
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Network |N | |E| λoriginal Φoriginal Φ{λ=1} Φ{λ=10} Φrandom
Facebook 4, 039 88, 234 43.7 0.519 0.011 0.117 0.0107
Twitter 81, 306 1, 342, 296 33 0.170 0.005 0.051 0.0004
Slashdot 82, 168 504, 230 12.3 0.024 0.001 0.019 0.0001
Higgs 456, 626 12, 508, 413 54.8 0.008 0.0001 0.001 0.0001
FIG. 7. Real-world contact networks. We consider four real-world contact networks from SNAP [53]. For each network, we
indicate the number of nodes |N |, the number of edges |E|, the mean degree of the original network λoriginal, and the clustering
coefficient of the original network Φoriginal. Φ{λ=1} (respectively, Φ{λ=10}) denotes the clustering coefficient of the original
network after removing a random subset of edges such that the resulting mean degree is 1 (respectively, 10). Φrandom denotes
the average clustering coefficient (over 200 independent realizations) of a random network generated by the configuration model
with Poisson degree distribution. The random network has the same number of nodes and the same (original) mean degree of
the corresponding real-world network.
- Twitter [53, 69]: The contact network among the
friends of 1000 users (including those 1000 users).
The network consists of 81, 306 users and 1, 342, 296
edges.
- Slashdot [53, 70]: The network contains
friend/foe links between the users of Slashdot. The
network consists of 82, 168 users and 504, 230 edges.
- Higgs [53, 71]: The Higgs data set has been col-
lected upon monitoring the spreading processes on
Twitter before, during and after the announce-
ment of the discovery of a new particle with the
features of the elusive Higgs boson on July 4,
2012. The network consists of 456, 626 nodes and
12, 508, 413 edges. Nodes correspond to the authors
of the collected tweets and edges represent the fol-
lowee/follower relationships between them.
More details on the networks, including their clustering
coefficients are given in Figure 7. We assume that all
edges are unidirectional.
B. Methods
To conduct a fair comparison between the formalism
given in Section IV.A and the single-type bond percola-
tion framework, we fix the parameters of the transmissi-
bility matrix T and the mutation matrix µ, hence fixing
ρ (Tµ) and TBP (according to (9)). We vary the mean de-
gree, denoted λ, for each of the four contact networks be-
tween 1 and 10. For each value of λ, we remove a random
subset of edges such that the resulting network is of mean
degree λ (approximately). Note that the random removal
of edges would indeed lower the clustering coefficient of
the network, however, the resulting subgraph would re-
main highly clustered compared to random networks with
the same mean degree (see Figure 7). In other words, the
sampled networks still exhibit specific structural proper-
ties that distinguish them from synthetic contact net-
works generated randomly by the configuration model
(with Poisson degree distribution of the same mean de-
gree). After the mean degree is adjusted, the process
proceeds similar to Section V.B.
C. Results
In Figure 8, we plot the probability of emergence for
the four contact networks shown in Figure 7. We compare
the results obtained by computer simulations with those
obtained by the multiple-strain formalism (Section IV.A)
and the single-type bond-percolation framework. We set
T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, and µ11 = µ22 = 0.75. It follows that
TBP = 0.4 according to (9).
Similar to our observations on random networks (Sec-
tion V.E), the single-type, bond-percolation framework
provides significantly inaccurate predictions on the prob-
ability of emergence, should the underlying process en-
tail evolution. The limitation is universal as it applies to
both random and real-world networks. Appendix A ex-
plains the intuition behind our observations. In contrast,
the multiple-strain formalism provides remarkably accu-
rate predictions, especially on contact networks with low
clustering coefficient. Note that the multi-type branching
framework assumes that the underlying graph is tree-like;
an assumption that holds for networks with small cluster-
ing coefficient. Hence, one could reasonably argue that
the multiple-strain formalism would provide high predic-
tion accuracy on such networks.
VII. CO-INFECTION CONTROLS THE ORDER
OF PHASE TRANSITION
The preceding discussion considers the case when co-
infection is not possible, hence each infected host either
carries strain-1 or strain-2, but not both. However, hu-
mans, animals, plants, and other organisms may become
co-infected with multiple pathogen strains, causing major
consequences for both within- and between-host disease
dynamics [59, 72, 73]. For instance, in the case of hu-
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FIG. 8. The probability of emergence on real-world contact networks. We consider four contact networks sampled
from SNAP data sets [53]. (a) Facebook network, (b) Twitter network, (c) Slashdot network, and (d) Higgs network. We set
T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, µ11 = µ22 = 0.75 (hence TBP = 0.4) and vary the mean degree, denoted λ, from 1 to 10. For each value
of λ, we remove a random subset of edges such that the resulting graph is of mean degree λ (approximately). The sampled
networks still exhibit significantly higher clustering coefficient as compared to random networks with the same mean degree.
The single-type bond-percolation framework provides inaccurate predictions on the probability of emergence, in contrast to
the multiple-strain formalism given in Section IV.A. The multiple-strain formalism offers remarkably accurate predictions on a
class of real-world networks with low clustering coefficient.
man malaria, the majority of infected adults are simul-
taneously infected by more than five strains of Plasmod-
ium falciparum [72, 74]. The competition and interaction
patterns between the resident strains trigger significant
ramifications of the disease dynamics. Also, the aggre-
gate virulence experienced by the co-infected host could
be higher than the most virulent strain, or lower than the
least virulent strain, or anywhere in between [72, 75–77].
In this section, we seek to shed the light on the ef-
fects of co-infection on disease propagation. In particular,
we investigate the extent to which co-infection dynamics
could enhance or suppress the scale of epidemics. Of par-
ticular interest is whether co-infection could change the
order of phase transition from second-order (as it is the
case with most epidemic models) to first-order, leading to
a phenomenon that is commonly described as avalanche
outbreaks [60]. To that end, we extend the multiple-strain
model given in Section III to account for co-infection.
In particular, a susceptible individual who comes into
infectious contacts with type-1 and type-2 hosts simul-
taneously becomes co-infected and starts to spread the
co-infection. Henceforth, we consider the case when the
co-infection has its own transmissibility Tco and does not
mutate back to either strain-1 or strain-2. In other words,
a co-infected host infects each of her neighbors indepen-
dently with probability Tco, and infected neighbors are
deemed co-infected with probability 1.
As with Section V, we consider contact networks with
Poisson degree distribution and Power-law degree distri-
bution with exponential cutoff, respectively. For both
cases, we set T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, and µ11 = µ22 = 0.75.
Moreover, we set the network size to 2 × 106 and the
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FIG. 9. Co-infection dynamics determine the order of phase transition. We set T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, and µ11 = µ22 =
0.75 for all subfigures. The network size n is 2× 106 and the number of independent experiments for each data point is 5× 103.
Blue circles denote the average total epidemic size S and red stars denote the average total epidemic size S conditioned on Sco
being greater than zero, i.e., conditioned on the existence of a positive fraction of co-infected nodes. Blue plus signs, orange
triangles, and yellow squares denote the fraction of nodes infected with strain-1, strain-2, and co-infection, respectively. The
black dashed-line denotes the epidemic size for a single-strain, bond-percolated network with Tco, i.e., S
BP
co . (a) and (c): A first
order phase transition is observed when Tco = 0.8 owing to the corresponding first order transition of Sco. Co-infection emerges
at the phase transition point that characterizes an epidemic of strain-1 and strain-2. At this point, the value of Sco jumps
discontinuously to (approximately) the corresponding value of SBPco with Tco = 0.8. Observe that S
BP
co > 0 at the transition
point, hence, a first-order phase transition is observed. (b) and (d): Co-infection still emerges right at the phase transition
point. However, since Tco is small, S
BP
co = 0 at the transition point. Hence, a second-order phase transition is observed.
number of independent experiments for each data point
to 5×103. To illustrate how co-infection dynamics control
the order of phase transition, we simulate and compare
the process for two values of Tco, namely Tco = 0.1 and
Tco = 0.8. Finally, we plot the epidemic size, denoted by
sBPco , for a single-strain, bond-percolated network [3].
In all cases, co-infection emerges at the phase transi-
tion point that characterizes an epidemic of strain-1 and
strain-2, i.e., the mean degree for which ρ(M ) = 1, where
M is given by
M =
( 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
)[
T1 0
0 T2
] [
µ11 µ12
µ21 µ22
]
As seen in Figure 9, a first-order phase transition is
observed on both contact networks when Tco = 0.8 due
to the corresponding first order transition of Sco. In par-
ticular, the value of Sco jumps discontinuously from zero
to (approximately) the corresponding value of SBPco for
a single-strain, bond-percolated network with Tco = 0.8.
Hence, a first-order phase transition is observed. In gen-
eral, we conjecture that a first-order phase transition
emerges whenever Tco is large enough such that S
BP
co > 0
at the critical point ρ(M ) = 1. If, however, Tco is small
such that SBPco = 0 when ρ(M ) = 1, then a second-order
phase transition is observed. This is confirmed by our
simulation results for the case when Tco = 0.1.
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In order to validate the order of phase transition when
Tco = 0.8, we conduct an extensive simulation study
around the phase transition point on both contact net-
works. In Figure 10, we set the number of nodes n to
15 × 106 (to alleviate finite size effects) and the number
of experiments to 104 for each data point. We use the
same parameters that were used to generate Figure 9,
i.e., T1 = 0.2, T2 = 0.5, and µ11 = µ22 = 0.75. Our
results confirm that the phase-transition is indeed first
order on both contact networks. In fact, the value of
Sco jumps discontinuously to (approximately) the corre-
sponding value of SBPco with Tco = 0.8.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the evolution of
spreading processes on complex networks and developed
a mathematical theory that unravels the relationship be-
tween the characteristics of the spreading process, evolu-
tion, and the structure of the contact network on which
the process spreads. Our mathematical theory was com-
plemented by an extensive simulation study on both ran-
dom and real-world contact networks. The simulation
results proved the validity of our theory and revealed
the significant shortcomings of the classical mathemat-
ical models that do not capture evolution. A match-
ing condition between single- and multiple-strain models
was proposed and evaluated in the context of probabil-
ity of emergence, epidemic size, and epidemic threshold.
Under the proposed matching condition, our results re-
vealed that the classical bond-percolation models may ac-
curately predict the threshold and final size of epidemics
that entail evolution, but their predictions on the prob-
ability of emergence are significantly inaccurate on both
random and real-world networks. Hence, our formalism
is necessary to bridge the disconnect between how spread-
ing processes propagate and evolve on complex networks,
and the current mathematical models that do not capture
evolution.
We proceeded by deriving a lower bound on the proba-
bility of emergence to gain further insights on the effects
of mutation. The bound was derived for the special case
of one-step irreversible mutation. Our results revealed
that the probability of mutation plays a key role in de-
termining the shape and behavior of the probability of
emergence. Moreover, the way the particular value of µ
influences the probability of mutation varies according to
the connectivity of the underlying contact network. Fi-
nally, we considered the case when co-infection is possible
and showed that co-infection dynamics control the order
of phase transition in an interesting way. In particular,
depending on co-infection dynamics, the order of phase
transition of the epidemic size could change from second-
order to first-order, in contrast to the universality class
of percolation models that are typically second-order.
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Appendix A: Correlations of infection events
We have shown that the inability of the single-type
bond-percolation framework to predict the probability of
emergence is universal; it is observed on both random and
real-world contact networks. The universality of the be-
havior suggests that single-type bond-percolation frame-
work does not properly capture a fundamental property
of spreading processes that entail evolution. Below, we
argue that this property is stemming from the underlying
correlations between the infection events of the multiple-
strain model. For reasons that will become apparent
soon, it is useful to draw parallels between the multiple
strain model proposed by Alexandar and Day [33] and
the single-strain model proposed by Newman in [3].
In [3], Newman proposed a stochastic SIR model where
the probability that an infected node i infects a suscep-
tible node j is given by Tij = 1 − exp(−βijτi), where
βij denotes the rate of infectious contacts from node i
to node j and τi denotes the infectious period of node
i, i.e., the period of time during which node i remains
infective. The infectious period τi is a random variable
with a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Fτ (u),
and the infectious contact rates βij is also a random vari-
able with a CDF Fβ(v). Newman claimed that under the
assumptions that i) the infectious contact rates between
individuals are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) and that ii) the infectious periods for all individ-
uals are also i.i.d., the spread of a diseases on a contact
network is isomorphic to a bond-percolation model on
the contact network with a bond percolation parameter
given by
T = 〈Tij〉 = 1−
∫ ∞
0
e−βτdFβ(β)dFτ (τ)
where T was called the transmissibility of the disease.
The isomorphism to a bond-percolation problem allowed
for the use of generating functions to derive the thresh-
old, probability, and final size of epidemics on a contact
network with arbitrary degree distributions.
Later on, Kenah and Robins [79] proved that this iso-
morphism to a bond-percolation problem is valid only
when the distribution of the infectious periods is degen-
erate, i.e., τi = τ0 for all i = 1, 2, . . ., where τ0 is a con-
stant. Kenah and Robins showed that when the distribu-
tion of the infectious periods is non-degenerate, there is
no bond-percolation probability that will make the bond-
percolation model isomorphic to the SIR model. The
fundamental reason behind their findings is the fact that
the infection events across edges emanating from node
i are conditionally independent given τi, but marginally
dependent unless τi = τ0 with probability one. That said,
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Kenah and Robins showed that even when the distribu-
tion of the infectious periods is non-degenerate, the map-
ping to a bond-percolation process can still be used to
accurately predict the epidemic threshold and epidemic
size.
The multiple-strain model presented by Alexander and
Day exhibits a similar form of correlations between in-
fection events. In particular, infection events are condi-
tionally independent given the type of the infective node.
Namely, conditioned on node i being infected with strain-
`, node i infects each of her neighbors independently with
probability T`. However, infection events are marginally
dependent, unless Ti = T0 for all i with probability one;
a condition that essentially reduces the dynamics to that
of single-strain processes without evolution. To give an
example, consider a regular network, where each node has
exactly 2 neighbors. Let T1 = 1 and µ11 = µ21 = µ. In
this case, we have TBP = µ+ T2 (1− µ) by virtue of (9).
Now, we can easily compute the probability that an in-
fection of a randomly selected node results in an outbreak
of size one. Under the bond percolation framework, this
is given by (1− TBP)2 = (1− µ− T2 (1− µ))2. However
the multiple-strain formalism predicts a zero probability
for this event, should the initial node be infected with
strain-1. Indeed, the probability predicted by the bond
percolation framework will match the one predicted by
the multiple-strain formalism only if T2 = 1 or µ = 1;
a condition that diminishes the role of evolution and re-
duces the dynamics into that of single-strain processes.
